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Why are labour-managed firms so rare in market economies? We address this
question by analysing the determinants of entry. A negative binomial random
effects model is used to examine a panel of UK entry data. Our main finding
is a significant negative relationship between entry counts and both the capital-
labour ratio and the variance of profits. This is consistent with long-standing
theoretical arguments that labour-managed firms face problems in raising capital
and spreading risk.
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1 Introduction
The initial impetus for research on labour-managed (LM) enterprises derived, in
large part, from an interest in socialist economies and, in particular, Yugoslavia’s
self-managed system. More recently, however, attention has turned to the be-
haviour and performance of LM firms operating within mixed economies. Thus
there is now a sizeable, mainly theoretical, literature concerned with comparisons
between, and interactions among, labour-managed and capitalist firms. One of
the most striking facts confronting such models is that LM firm sectors are invari-
ably very small. A variety of explanations have been put forward. Ben-Ner (1984,
1985) and Miyazaki (1984) argue that labour managed production will often be
inhibited by the availability of a pool of wage workers and that, paradoxically,
the problem is more serious when incomes in the LM firm would be high. The
point is simply that if the income per worker in a LM firm exceeds the market
wage, then the replacement of a member with a hired employee would, other
things being equal, raise the incomes of the remaining members. Thus Ben-Ner
(1984) argues that worker cooperatives will gradually transform themselves into
capitalist firms as members leave. Moreover, as Miyazaki points out, the same
argument might preclude the establishment of a LM firm in the first place - an
entrepreneur would prefer to establish a capitalist firm and thereby appropriate
all, rather than a share of, the profit. Hansmann (1988, 1996) emphasises prob-
lems associated with collective decision-taking. For instance, it is well known
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that majority voting among heterogeneous individuals can generate inefficient
outcomes when the preferences of the median voter differ from the mean. Also,
there may be attempts by individuals or groups to manipulate the distribution
of surplus in their favour. Such activities may generate influence costs for the
firm as a whole.1 A third potential explanation concerns incentives to supply
effort. In an influential contribution, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that,
where production is carried out in teams, an organisation - such as a LM firm
- that bases individual rewards on total output will experience free-riding and
will be less productive than a firm in which a specialist monitor takes the role of
residual claimant. However, in a recent survey, Dow and Putterman (2000) point
to the absence of a theoretical consensus on the issue of incentives and relative
productivity, and note that the empirical literature suggests that LM firms may
not be at a disadvantage in this respect.2
In this paper we focus on two long-standing lines of argument - finance and
risk - on which there is theoretical agreement. Furthermore, they offer a potential
explanation not only of the relative scarcity of LM firms in market economies, but
also of their tendency to concentrate in particular sectors.3 The starting point for
the finance theory is the argument that ownership generates strong incentives to
take good care of equipment and thus it will often be more efficient for a firm to
1For a more general discussion of influence activities and costs, see Milgrom and Roberts
(1992).
2A survey of the empirical literature is provided by Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993).
3Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993) report a clustering in the construction industry in
Italy, France and Sweden, and in printing in France and the UK.
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purchase, rather than rent, its capital. It is then argued that moral hazard and
adverse selection considerations favour internal over external financing of capital.
This, in turn, creates a potential problem for LM firms because workers may lack
sufficient wealth to undertake the purchase. Thus Drèze predicts that LM firms
will “...find themselves confined to the more labour-intensive, low investment
sectors of the economy.” (1989, p. 86).4 Turning to risk, the argument is simply
that LM membership will expose workers to risk in the returns to both human
and capital financial capital. As Meade points out: “While property owners can
spread their risks by putting small bits of their property into a large number of
concerns, a worker cannot put small bits of effort into a large number of different
jobs.” and thus “...we are likely to find cooperative structures in lines of activity
in which the risk is not too great ...” (1972, p. 426).
The existing empirical literature offers little insight on these issues. A number
of studies have sought to compare the level of capital intensity in LM and capi-
talist firms but, in the view of Bonin and Putterman (1993), no clear conclusions
have emerged. As far as we are aware, the predictions on the distribution of LM
activity have not previously been tested. In this paper we conduct such a test
using data on entry in UK manufacturing. A negative binomial random effects
model is used to examine a panel of entry data over the period 1981-85. We find
that capital intensity and risk do have a negative impact on LM firm entry.
4Bowles and Gintis (1996) argue agency problems in credit markets are more severe for
employee-run than conventional firms and that, as a result, the size of the employee-run firm
sector is sensitive to the distribution of wealth.
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In the following section we present a brief overview of labour-management
in the UK. Section 3 then develops an empirical model of LM firm entry, draw-
ing heavily on the profit-maximising firm entry literature. Section 4 discusses
the econometric issues associated with modelling entry counts. Our results are
presented in Section 5, and a short concluding section then completes the paper.
2 An overview of labour-management in the UK
Labour-managed firms in the UK were granted legal status and limited liability
in 1852, yet in 1900 the total number of such firms stood at just one hundred
or so, and by 1975 it had dwindled to less than twenty (Estrin and Pérotin,
1987). This is not to say that entry during the period was negligible. Estrin
and Pérotin report, for example, that some two hundred were formed between
1852 and 1880. However, with a few exceptions, their life-spans were short: only
about twenty survived beyond the recession of 1878-80. The prospects for labour-
management improved under the Labour government in the mid 1970s. In 1976
the Industrial Common Ownership Fund was set up to provide funds for labour-
managed firms, and in 1978 the National Cooperative Development Agency was
founded to promote the sector through the provision of advice and research.
In addition, general awareness of labour-management as an alternative mode of
production was heightened by the attempt to save three large bankrupt capitalist
firms - Triumph Motorcycles, Kirkby Manufacturing and the Scottish Daily News
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- by converting them into LM firms. The number of such enterprises began to
grow rapidly and by 1985 had reached almost 800 according to calculations by
Hobbs and Jefferis (1990) or 1400 according to Cooperative Development Agency
figures cited by Estrin and Pérotin.5 It is this period of sustained expansion that
provides the entry data for our analysis.6
Table 1 presents data on annual registrations of labour-managed firms by
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 1980) industry division over the ten year
period 1976-85.
5The difference between the two estimated totals for 1995 reflects differences in both the
definition of a “worker co-operative” and the method of compiling the data. For example,
the Cooperative Development Agency figures include some enterprises that contain non-worker
members, and assume that a registered cooperative is still trading unless there is evidence to
the contrary; Hobbs and Jefferis, by contrast, exclude any firms with non-worker members and
require positive evidence that an enterprise is still trading (see Hobbs and Jefferis, 1990, for
further discussion). The question of whether or not a particular firm is still trading is, of course,
irrelevant to the analysis of entry.




UK Labour-Managed Firm Entry 1976-85
INDUSTRY (SIC 1980 DIVISIONS) 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total
0 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 5 10 6 26
1 Energy and Water 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 Extraction of Minerals and Ores other than Fuels; Manufacture
of Metals, Mineral Products and Chemicals
0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 3 0 7
3 Metal Goods, Engineering and Vehicles 1 0 1 0 2 5 9 10 11 8 47
4 Other Manufacturing 2 7 13 12 13 22 34 33 67 34 237
5 Construction 2 2 1 7 3 13 24 24 35 15 126
6 Distribution, Hotels and Catering; Repairs 10 12 27 21 28 16 33 52 64 53 316
7 Transport and Communication 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 7 9 3 25
8 Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business Services and Leasing 1 0 2 2 3 10 19 18 28 19 102
9 Other Services 3 1 7 10 8 13 25 40 65 53 225
Unclassified 0 5 10 9 7 16 16 33 34 79 209
TOTAL 19 27 63 64 66 98 165 223 326 270 1321
Source: Worker Co-operative Database, London Common Ownership Movement
The two most striking features of the data are first, the dramatic increase in
entry over time - with registrations in 1985 fourteen times higher than the 1976
figure - and second, the high degree of industry concentration. Five industry
divisions accounted for over ninety percent of classifiable registrations. These
include Other Manufacturing which contains the historically attractive clothing
and printing sectors, and Distribution, Hotels, Catering and Repairs, where food
retailing and restaurants accounted for the majority of registrations.
The data in Table 1 can be put into context by looking at the general pattern
of entry in the UK, measured by Value Added Tax (VAT) registrations. There is,
of course, a contrast in scale: over the period 1976-85 there were more than one
and a half million VAT registrations, compared with just 1321 LM entrants. But,
perhaps more interestingly, there are noticeable differences in the entry patterns
both over time and across industries. Thus, a comparison of total registrations in
the first half of the period (1976-80) with the second (1981-85) reveals a growth
rate of well over three hundred percent in the case of the LM firms, compared
with just eleven percent in VAT registrations. Industry comparisons are restricted
to broad groups due to the differences between the SIC and VAT classification
systems. Nevertheless, the figures presented in Table 2 do indicate some marked
contrasts. In particular, it can be seen that more than a quarter of LM entrants
flow into Production, compared with just ten percent of the VAT registrations
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and, conversely, Distribution, Hotels, Catering and Repairs accounts for twenty-
eight percent of LM entrants but almost forty-five percent of VAT registrations.
Table 2
LM Firm and VAT Registrations 1976-85
INDUSTRY Registrations (%)
LMF VAT
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2.3 4.7
Production 26.3 9.9
Construction 11.3 14.8
Transport and Communication 2.2 4.6
Distribution, Hotels, Catering and Repairs 28.4 44.6
Services 29.4 21.4
Total registrations 1321 1,635,500
Whilst the industry groups in Table 2 are too broad to address the issue of
the size of the LM firm sector, the data does nevertheless provide a tentative
suggestion that the entry process of LM firms might be somewhat different from
that of other types of enterprise.
3 A model of labour-managed firm entry
In a seminal contribution to the theory of labour management, Ward (1958)
explored the behaviour of a firm in which income was shared equally among
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workers and had the objective of maximising income per worker. Comparisons
between this “Illyrian” LM firm and a profit-maximising firm operating with
the same technology and in the same product and capital markets reveal that,
under conditions where a competitive or monopoly profit-maximising firm makes
a positive profit, incomes in its LM firm twin would exceed the competitive wage
rate; thus labour-management would be attractive to workers. Conversely, if the
profit-maximising firm were to suffer a loss then prospective LM firm members
would be better off seeking employment elsewhere at the competitive wage (see,
for example, Ireland and Law, 1982). This equivalence suggests that the empirical
literature on profit-maximising firm entry might provide a useful starting point
for our analysis.
The standard approach to modelling variations in entry across industries dates
back to Orr (1974).7 Drawing on the limit price literature, Orr argued that there
exists a threshold level of profit - the “entry limiting profit rate” - below which no
entry will occur into an industry, and that observed entry will be a positive func-
tion of the difference between actual and entry limiting profit rates. Whilst entry
limiting profit rates are not directly observable, data are available on underlying
entry barriers so that, for empirical implementation, entry can be expressed as
a function of actual profit and a set of barriers. However, notwithstanding Orr’s
use of the term “entry”, this is best viewed as a model of changes in the equilib-
7For a survey see Geroski (1995) and for recent applications see Fotopoulos and Spence
(1998, 1999).
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rium stock of firms rather than entry flows.8 In practice, a substantial component
of the entry flow into an industry represents turnover among firms rather than
an increase in the stock.9 Thus, an industry in which actual profit is equal to
the entry limiting rate may be in equilibrium in terms of the stock of firms but
nevertheless exhibit an inflow of entrants. To take account of turnover, a measure
of industry size can be included among the explanatory variables.
Applying this framework to LM firm entry, the first point to note is that
the relationship with industry profit is less clear a priori. Whilst the simple
Illyrian comparison suggests a positive relationship, the arguments of Ben-Ner
and Miyazaki referred to earlier point in the opposite direction. Moreover, to
the extent that there differences between LM firms and capitalist firms that are
not captured by the Illyrian model - such as possible incentive differences - then
industry profit will be an imperfect indicator of the returns available within a
LM firm.10 Our main interest, however, lies with the question of whether capital
requirements and risk constitute entry barriers for LM firms. We measure the
former by the industry capital-labour ratio and the latter by the variance in
industry profits over the relevant period. Industry size, measured by total sales,
is included to take account of turnover and also as a scale factor - for a given
8In fact, Orr estimates his model using data on changes in the stock of firms rather than
the number of entrants.
9Work by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) on US manufacturing industries has re-
vealed that both entry and exit rates - measured over a four year period - averaged more than
thirty percent, and that the industries with high entry rates also exhibited high rates of exit.
10There may also be differences between LM and profit-maximising firms in a strategic setting.
See, for example, Stewart (1991), Cremer and Crémer (1992), Ireland and Stewart (1995) and
Neary and Ulph (1997).
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divergence between the actual and entry limiting profit rate the change in the
stock of firms per period (net entry) is likely to be positively related to industry
size.
Most studies of entry incorporate a measure of the industry growth rate. One
justification for its inclusion is that potential entrants might use past growth to
estimate future growth in the industry’s equilibrium number of firms (see, for
example, Carree and Thurik, 1999). The same argument could be applied to
LM firm entry and therefore we include the growth of industry sales among the
regressors. We also consider the possibility that a relationship exists between
industry unionisation and LM firm entry. Acs and Audretsch (1989), argue that
small (typically nonunionised) profit-maximising firms will be attracted to highly
unionised sectors due to a possible cost advantage over larger, unionised rivals.
In terms of the entry model, the implication is that industry profit, being an
average of profits in unionised and nonunionised firms, understates the profit
available to a nonunionised entrant. Their empirical analysis of net entry into
US manufacturing industries provides support for this hypothesis. However, the
argument implicitly assumes that the opportunity cost of an entrant is indepen-
dent of the level of unionisation; for a LM firm this assumption will not hold if
industry-specific skills tie workers to their current industry. In this case workers
in highly unionised industries may have less incentive to set up a LM firm due to
their higher opportunity cost. The issue is further complicated by evidence that,
in Britain, the ability of a union to capture rent is contingent upon the existence
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of product market power (Stewart, 1990). Thus, whilst theory suggests chan-
nels through which unionisation might affect LM entry, the unionisation variable
cannot be signed a priori.
We thus have the following model of LM firm entry:
Eit = f(πit−1,Ki, Ri, Sit−1, Git−1, Ui) (1)
where Eit is the number of LM firm entrants into industry i in period t, πit−1 is a
measure of lagged industry profits, Ki is the capital-labour ratio, Ri is a measure
of risk, Sit−1 is lagged total industry sales, Git−1 is the lagged growth of sales and
Ui is the level of unionisation.
Clearly there may be industry-specific effects that are not accounted for in
the above set of explanatory variables. The model is thus best analysed using
a panel data approach. In the following section we discuss the econometric is-
sues associated with both panel data and the particular properties of our entry
variable.
4 Data and econometric issues
Our data relate to the UK manufacturing sector over the period 1980-85. The
entry variable is the number of LM firm entrants in an industry (defined using
the Standard Industrial Classification at the three-digit level of disaggregation) in
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each of the years 1981-85. Explanatory variables were obtained from the Census
of Production and New Earnings Survey, and details of all variables are provided
in the appendix.11
4.1 Modelling Count Data
The central feature of our data for LM firm entry is that they are expressed as
event counts. The variable we seek to explain is measured as the number of LM
firms entering each SIC industry group in any one year. This variable may take
any non-negative integer value, including zero. Thus our dependent variable is
discrete, and so cannot be treated as a continuous random variable. There are
two consequences of this. Firstly, the familiar linear regression model is no longer
appropriate, as it does not constrain the dependent variable to take only non-
negative integer values. Secondly, the presence of zero-counts (i.e. where no LM
firm enters an industry group in a particular year) must be allowed for explicitly.
The second of these problems rules out one simple transformation of the linear
regression framework commonly used to circumvent part of the first problem, i.e.
by taking logarithms of the dependent variable. Naturally, such a transformation
is invalid if any count is zero.
There is now a large body of statistical literature dealing with modelling just
this sort of count data. In addition, there is also a growing number of applied
11We are grateful to Martin Conyon and Steven Machin for providing the data on
unionisation.
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studies addressing these issues from an econometric point of view. Good recent
coverage of this literature - both theoretical and applied - is given by Cameron
and Trivedi (1986, 1998). The most basic model that is usually estimated in
these studies is the Poisson regression model. The Poisson regression model
specifies that the event count variable yi (i = 1, ..., n) given the set of k linearly
independent regressors xi is Poisson distributed with p.d.f.
f(yi | xi) =
e−µiµyi
yi!
, yi = 0, 1, 2, ...
and mean parameter given by the following exponential mean function
E(yi | xi) = µi = exp (x0iβ) .
Note that this implies that µi > 0. Interest usually centres upon estimating (by,
e.g., the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)) the unknown parameter vector
β in the conditional mean function E(yi | xi) = exp (x0iβ). In addition, the
equidispersion property of the Poisson distribution (i.e. its variance is the same
as its mean) implies that
Var(yi | xi) = E(yi | xi) = exp (x0iβ) ,
so that the conditional variance is not a constant, i.e. the regression is het-
eroskedastic.
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4.2 The Negative Binomial Model
Since the phenomenon of overdispersion (where the conditional variance is greater
than the conditional mean) is often found in empirical studies, this is often re-
garded as the principle disadvantage of the Poisson regression model. Overdis-
persion turns out to be a characteristic of our data (see the appendix for a data
summary). The standard model to account for overdispersion is the Negative
Binomial model.
The most common negative binomial model used in econometric applications
is referred to by Cameron and Trivedi (1986) as the NB2 model, with mean
function µi and variance function µi + αµ2i . This has p.d.f.
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If the negative binomial model is correctly specified, the NB2 MLE (bβNB2, bαNB2) is
consistent for β and α and is asymptotically normally distributed. It is also robust
to distributional misspecification (because it belongs to the linear exponential
family for specified α), so that provided the conditional mean is correctly specified
the NB2 MLE is consistent for β. Note that the standard errors of the NB2 MLE
will generally be inconsistent if there is any distributional misspecification. They
are inconsistent if the variance function is incorrectly specified (so that ωi 6=
µi+αµ2i ), but even if the variance function is correctly specified (so ωi = µi+αµ2i ),
then VML[bβNB2] is evaluated at an inconsistent estimate of α. Consistency of bαNB2
requires that yi is negative binomial.
4.3 Modelling Panel Data of Counts
We apply the NB2 model to panel data of counts, where both the count variable
yit of LM firm entry and the regressors xit vary over both SIC industry group
i and over time t. Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) introduced this model
with random effects. Assuming yit is i.i.d. NB2 with parameters λiµit and αi
where µit = exp(x0itβ), then yit has mean λiµit/αi and variance (λiµit/αi)(1 +
λi/αi). Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) assume that the industry group
specific random effects are such that (1 + λi/αi)−1 is a beta-distributed random
variable with parameters (a, b).
Given the relatively large industry dimension (90 SICs) relative to the small
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time dimension (5 years) of our panel data, we choose to model these industry
specific effects by the random effects specification detailed above, rather than
using the alternative of a fixed effects specification. Similarly, because of the short
time dimension, we do not include any time trend in the specification, and choose
to model the growth in LM firm registrations over the sample period indirectly
through (changes in) our industry-specific regressors. Given these assumptions,
it is then possible to obtain the MLE of the parameters β, a, and b. These are
the parameters reported in the following section.
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5 Results
Negative binomial estimates of equation (1), with random effects, are reported
in Table 3.
Table 3











* White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors
Industry profit attracts a positive but insignificant coefficient. This perhaps
unsurprising given the theoretical arguments set out earlier and also Geroski’s
(1995) observation that, in studies of aggregate entry, the coefficient is often
small and imprecisely measured. Interestingly, Acs and Audretsch (1989), found
that profit was significant for a sample of firms with up to 500 employees, but
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insignificant for smaller firms. Their explanation - that small firms often operate
in niches - might also be pertinent to LM firm entry.
The coefficient on the capital-labour ratio is significantly negative and thus
consistent with Drèze’s (1989) argument that LM firms face problems in raising
capital. Similarly, Meade’s (1972) argument that LM firms will be constrained by
workers’ inability to spread risk is supported by the significant negative coefficient
on risk. Interestingly, these results are reflected strongly in the raw data: only
one of the ten SICs with the highest capital-labour ratios experienced LM firm
entry over the period 1981-85 (brewing and malting), whilst LM firms entered
eight of the ten SICs with the lowest capital-labour ratios (the exceptions being
fur goods and textile machinery); and LM entry occurred in just one of the ten
highest risk sectors, compared with seven of the ten lowest.
The coefficient on industry sales is, as expected, significantly positive but
we find no evidence of a relationship between entry and the growth of sales -
the proxy for firms’ expectations of future growth - or unionisation. On the
other hand, we do find strong evidence for the significance of industry-specific
effects (with a likelihood ratio test statistic of 50.82, asymptotically distributed
as χ2(8)).
In section 2 we saw that, at the level of broad industry groups, the pattern
of LM firm entry was quite different to that of aggregate entry as measured by
VAT registrations. A more detailed comparison of the entry processes was unfor-
tunately precluded by differences in the system of industrial classification. It is
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also difficult to set our results in the context of the existing empirical literature
on (capitalist firm)12 entry due to differences in both data and model specifica-
tion. On the central issue of the implications of capital requirements and risk for
entry, we are aware of two studies that include the capital-labour ratio among
the regressors and two that employ the variance of profit as a measure of risk.
Acs and Audretsch (1989), in their study of US manufacturing, detected a signifi-
cant negative relationship between the capital-labour ratio and the net entry (the
change in the stock) of firms with up to 250 employees. Fotopoulos and Spence
(1998) similarly report a significant negative coefficient in their analysis of gross
entry into 2-digit Greek manufacturing industries. There is less support for the
hypothesis that risk constitutes an entry barrier. The coefficient on risk is signif-
icant (at the 10% level or better) in just two of the five specifications reported
by Orr (1974) and in neither of the two sets of estimates in Highfield and Smiley
(1987). This hints at a contrast between LM firm and profit-maximising firm en-
try processes, but again differences in data and methodology must be recognised.
In particular, Orr, as noted earlier, utilises the change in the stock of firms as his
entry variable whilst Highfield and Smiley analyse relative entry rates.13
12This literature does not distinguish firms according to organisational form. However, given
the very small size of the LM sector, existing results can be interpreted as pertaining to con-
ventional (“capitalist”) firms.
13In terms of model specification, one major difference is that none of the four studies take
account of industry random effects.
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6 Conclusions
A striking feature of production within market economies is that only rarely do
workers own and control firms. A variety of possible theoretical explanations
has been advanced but, as Dow and Putterman (2000) note in their survey,
no consensus has emerged. In this paper we used data on LM firm entry into
UK manufacturing industries to test theoretical arguments concerning finance
and risk. The entry data take the form of a panel of event counts and thus
were estimated using a negative binomial model with random effects. We found
that entry was positively associated with industry size, but negatively related to
the capital-labour ratio and the variance of profits. There was also evidence of
industry specific effects. These results are consistent with theoretical arguments
that LM firms face difficulties in raising finance and spreading risk, and thus may
help to explain the small size of the LM firm sector in the UK.
Our analysis is limited in at least two important respects. First, a focus on
entry can only provide a partial account of the determinants of organisational
form. A complete understanding would also require consideration of the post
entry experience of firms. Second, our results, whilst suggesting a role for finance
and risk in the determination of entry, do not provide any indication of their
importance relative to the other potential determinants. In particular, we were
unable to assess theoretical arguments regarding productivity, collective decision-
taking and appropriation of profit.
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In terms of policy, the results tentatively point to finance and risk as a pos-
sible policy focus should a government desire to promote worker participation.
Interestingly, the Mondragon group of cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain
- widely regarded as one of the most successful LM firm sectors - addressed both
problems. At an early stage in the group’s history, a bank (the Caja Laboral
Popular) was set up with the explicit purpose of providing external funds for LM
firms and later, as the sector expanded, a number of firms participated in labour
and revenue pooling schemes.14
14See Thomas and Logan (1982).
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APPENDIX
Our data are annual and relate to the UK manufacturing sector over the
period 1980-1985. Industries are defined using the Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (1980) at the three-digit level of disaggregation. The manufacturing sector
comprises industries from “groups” 210 to 495 inclusive. After deleting those for
which there was no unionisation data (14 cases) or Census of Production Data (1
missing case and 3 amalgamated with other groups) there were 90 manufacturing
industry groups to analyse.
Entry: The essential characteristic of a LM firm (workers’ cooperative) is that it
is controlled by the workforce. A variety of structures have been proposed which
can claim to accord with this general principle. Our entry variable comprises
cooperative registrations contained on the Worker Co-operative Database com-
piled by the London Industrial Common Ownership Movement. This adopts a
broad definition of a cooperative and is regarded as comprehensive; see Hobbs
and Jefferis (1990) for discussion.
Profits: This is the industry price-cost margin, defined as: net output (gross
output minus materials) minus total wages and salaries minus net capital expen-
diture, all divided by gross output. Source: Census of Production.
Capital/Labour : This is the average capital per employee over the period 1980-
84, defined as attributable capital divided by total employment (operatives plus
others). Attributable capital is calculated by assigning two-digit capital stocks
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to three-digit groups in proportion to aggregated net capital expenditures over
the period 1980-84. Source: Census of Production.
Risk : This is the variance of industry profits over the period 1980-84.
Sales: This is total industry sales. Source: Census of Production.
Growth: This is the annual growth rate of sales.
Unionisation: This variable was provided by Martin Conyon and Steven Machin.
It is available for 1985 only and measures the proportion of male annual employ-





Variable Mean SD Min Max
Entry 81 0.30 1.24 0 8
Entry 82 0.43 1.84 0 16
Entry 83 0.49 1.81 0 15
Entry 84 0.80 2.79 0 21
Entry 85 0.46 1.65 0 14
Profits 80 0.186 0.084 -0.024 0.446
Profits 81 0.203 0.078 0.058 0.494
Profits 82 0.206 0.080 0.049 0.496
Profits 83 0.216 0.081 0.028 0.544
Profits 84 0.211 0.075 0.099 0.511
Capital/Labour 0.052 0.038 0.010 0.182
Risk ×1000 0.721 1.256 0.018 9.729
Sales 80 1766.0 1621.2 99.5 8050.9
Sales 81 1783.3 1694.5 96.0 8461.2
Sales 82 1907.1 1814.8 75.2 8605.5
Sales 83 2040.5 1984.5 73.0 10129.4
Sales 84 2255.5 2244.7 66.3 11551.8
Growth 80 0.066 0.103 -0.180 0.431
Growth 81 -0.006 0.075 -0.188 0.241
Growth 82 0.063 0.087 -0.217 0.446
Growth 83 0.059 0.094 -0.322 0.341
Growth 84 0.096 0.117 -0.225 0.685
Unionisation 0.648 0.140 0.306 0.934
Note: Statistics calculated over the 90 SIC groups
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